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INTRODUCTION
Corporate law is premised upon two fundamental principles:
the pooling of moneys for investment purposes and the privilege of lim-
ited liability. The pooling of money enables promoters and investors to
efficiently amass and organize substantial sums for investment pur-
poses.1 The privilege of limited liability assures investors that personal
liability for the underlying invested activity is limited to the moneys
invested. Limited liability is a sacrosanct principle and a quintessen-
tial investment assumption within the investment community. Private
equity firms have successfully exploited these two policies.
However, a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeal casts a
shadow of doubt on the scope of the privilege of limited liability. In Sun
Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus-
try Pension Fund (“Sun Capital Partners”), the First Circuit found a
private equity fund2 liable for the 4.5 million dollar withdrawal pen-
sion liability of one of its portfolio companies.3 Under traditional
corporate law principles, an investor’s liability is limited to its invest-
ment in the venture. What makes Sun Capital Partners unique is that
it is the first reported decision holding a private equity fund liable for
1. ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 3 (6th ed. 2009).
2. “The prototypical ‘private equity’ fund pools the capital of sophisticated investors,
purchases ailing companies, restructures the companies, and then resells them—at a profit,
if all goes well.” Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity
Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071,
1073 (2008).
3. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 137 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
37680-fam
_11-1 Sheet No. 85 Side A      09/19/2016   08:25:28
37680-fam_11-1 Sheet No. 85 Side A      09/19/2016   08:25:28
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\11-1\FAM105.txt unknown Seq: 3  6-SEP-16 15:52
2015 “TRADE OR BUSINESS” IN INCOME TAX LAW 161
the pension withdrawal liability of its portfolio companies.4 Predict-
ably, the reaction by the private equity investment community was
swift and disapproving of a finding of liability in this case.5 Sun Capi-
tal Partners also exposes a deeper problem – the underlying tension
between competing federal and state policy objectives.
The Sun Capital Partners decision represents a departure from
the traditional view that an investor’s liability is limited because two
critical factors converged in this case. First, the applicable labor stat-
ute imposes liability when an investor’s activity constitutes a “trade or
business.” In particular, the labor statute at issue provides that “[t]o
impose withdrawal liability on an organization other than the one obli-
gated to the [pension] Fund, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
organization must be under ‘common control’ with the obligated organ-
ization, and (2) the organization must be a trade or business.”6 The
labor statute cross-references Section 401(c) of the Income Tax Code
when defining “trade or business.” Regrettably, Section 401(c) does not
define “trade or business,” leaving litigants, regulators, and courts
with no guidance as to its meaning. Second, there is substantial evi-
dence in the record demonstrating that the private equity fund was
aggressively involved in the daily activities of the portfolio company,
thereby exposing itself to the claim that it was engaging in the “trade
or business” of operating the portfolio company.7
There are over 1,000 references to the phrase “trade or busi-
ness” in the tax code, each with different policy objectives and
implications. The phrase “trade or business” is not defined in the In-
come Tax Code nor is it defined in the Income Tax Regulations. Three
Supreme Court cases address the question of whether the activity at
issue constitutes a trade or business. However, the Supreme Court
does not define the meaning of “trade or business.”
For income tax purposes, the determination of whether an ac-
tivity is a trade or business imports a variety of consequences ranging
4. Id. at 132-33 (“This case presents important issues of first impression as to with-
drawal liability for the pro rata share of unfunded vested benefits to a multiemployer
pension fund of a bankrupt company, here, Scott Brass, Inc. (SBI).”).
5. See John Boyd & Jason Cabico, A Warning Shot for Private Equity Funds: First
Circuit Court of Appeals Holds Fund Engaged in a “Trade or Business” for Purposes of Allo-
cating ERISA Pension Withdrawal Liability, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 14, 2013), http://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-warning-shot-for-private-equity-funds-93409/; see also Derek
Moitoso, Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pen-
sion Fund, MASS.GOV: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT ADMIN. COMM’N (Oct. 9, 2013), http://
www.mass.gov/perac/training/Legal/WED_SUNCAPITAL_MACRS2013.pdf.
6. Sun Capital Partners III, LP, 724 F.3d at 138.
7. Id. at 134.
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from granting a tax benefit, to qualifying tax benefits, to imposing an
income tax burden. For instance, Section 1628 of the Income Tax Code
grants taxpayers the benefit of deducting from gross income “ordinary
and necessary” expenses “incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business.”9 In contrast, Section 882 burdens foreign
taxpayers “engaged in a trade or business” within the United States to
report their “effectively connected income” and pay their corresponding
U.S.-based income tax liability.10
For labor law purposes, the determination of whether an activ-
ity is a trade or business under the labor statute imports only one
consequence, the imposition of a withdrawal liability. The function of
the trade or business requirement in this context is radically different
than in the income tax context. This singular policy objective within
the labor statute justifies reading “trade or business” differently than
when used in the Income Tax Code.
In what sense does Congress intend the use of the phrase “trade
or business” when applying the Labor statute? Did Congress intend the
phrase “trade or business” to adopt the permissive sense of an “ordi-
nary and necessary” business deduction under section 162? Or, did
Congress intend some other sense of the use of the phrase?
This paper explores the meaning of this disputed and elusive
term as applied outside of the tax forum. It examines the term within
the context of the labor code, its relevance to other federal statutes
generally, and its significance to private equity investment activity,
specifically. It concludes by advancing two proposals. The first
prescribes a definition of the term “trade or business” when applying
the contested labor statute. The second is a method of construction al-
ready recognized by our courts, but never before applied to this statute.
These proposals are especially relevant for use within the context of
tiered structures as typically found in private equity investment.
Sun Capital Partners exposes a sharp conflict between compet-
ing federal and state policy justifications. The federal government
seeks to protect pensions.11 State governments seek to encourage in-
vestment and broaden economic activity in order to benefit an array of
8. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012).
9. Id. at § 162(a).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 882(a) (providing the general rule that “[a] foreign corporation engaged
in trade or business within the United States during the taxable year shall be taxable as
provided in section 11, 55, 59A, or 1201(a) on its taxable income which is effectively con-
nected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States”).
11. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et al. (2006) (penalizing com-
panies with underfunded pensions by requiring them to pay higher premiums).
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constituents.12 These competing policies present a conflict with broad
implications for investors, regulators, and labor.
Part I of this paper analyzes the relevant facts of Sun Capital
Partners. Part II examines the business practices of the private equity
industry and presents arguments by proponents and critics of private
equity investment with a view toward informing the debate regarding
when an activity constitutes a “trade or business.” Part III examines
the historical significance of the phrase “trade or business,” its applica-
tion within the labor statute, its habitual deployment by Congress
throughout various federal statutes, and its presumed meaning by
courts. Finally, Part IV states a proposal and conclusion.
I. SUMMARY OF SUN CAPITAL13
In Sun Capital Partners, the New England Teamsters & Truck-
ing Industry Pension Fund (“Teamsters”) challenged the activities of
two commonly controlled private equity investment funds.14 The
Teamsters argued that the equity funds were engaged in a trade or
business under applicable federal law. As a result, the Teamsters
sought a 4.5 million dollar withdrawal pension liability payment from
the equity fund on behalf of its members.15 The “two private equity
funds [asserted] they are mere passive investors” in the portfolio com-
pany and, therefore, are not engaged in a trade or business as
maintained by the Teamsters Pension Fund.16
12. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the
United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 589 (1994). States seek to
broaden economic activity for investors, employers, employees, and consumers. Id.
13. The litigant, Sun Capital Partners, Inc., describes itself as “a pioneer in private
equity investing, uniquely combining the financial skills and resources of a traditional
private equity firm with the insight and expertise of a world class operating team. The firm
focuses on market-leading companies that can benefit from our in-house professionals,
resources, and expertise in their efforts to materially improve operating performance. Sun
Capital affiliates have invested in more than 335 companies worldwide with combined sales
in excess of $45 billion since our inception in 1995.” Affiliate of Sun Capital Partners, Inc.
Enters into Definitive Agreement to Sell Emerald Performance Materials, 4-TRADERS (June
4, 2014), http://www.4-traders.com/news/Affiliate-of-Sun-Capital-Partners-Inc-Enters-Into-
Definitive-Agreement-to-Sell-Emerald-Performance—18545971/; see also About Us, SUN
CAPITAL PARTNERS, INC., http://www.suncappart.com/?page_id=10 (last visited Jan. 31,
2016) (“Sun Capital affiliates have invested in more than 340 companies worldwide with
combined sales in excess of $45 billion since our inception in 1995. On a consolidated basis,
Sun Capital’s affiliated portfolio companies would rank in the top 100 of Fortune
Magazine’s listing of the 500 largest companies in the United States.”).
14. See Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pen-
sion Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 129 (1st Cir. 2013).
15. Id. at 136-38.
16. See id. at 132.
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The equity funds initiated a suit in district court seeking a de-
claratory judgment establishing that they were not engaged in a trade
or business. The district court granted the plaintiff’s request for a de-
claratory judgment. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed and rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that it was
not engaged in a trade or business. The Court of Appeals found that
one of the funds, Fund IV, was engaged in a trade or business and,
therefore, subject to payment of the pension withdrawal fee. The Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for a determination
of whether Fund III was likewise engaged in a trade or business.17 Un-
fortunately, the First Circuit did not offer a standard of review to aid in
determining when an investment activity by an equity fund constitutes
a trade or business.18 The ownership structure of the Sun Funds in-
vestment is complicated and multilayered. Several tiers of companies
with interlacing ownership interests separate the investors from the
target investment. In 2007, Sun Capital Advisors Inc., (“Fund Orga-
nizer”), “a private equity firm,”19 pooled investors’ money and
organized two investments funds, Sun Fund III L.P., and Sun Fund IV
L.P. (“Funds”). The Funds then created a series of intermediary compa-
nies for the purposes of ultimately acquiring the target portfolio
company, SBI. In the process, the Funds created SSB-LLC, which in
turn created SBHC, which then acquired 100% of the target portfolio
company, SBI. Within the chain of entities in this corporate structure,
SBI was the operating company and, as such, conducted business oper-
ations with customers and suppliers and employed a labor force. SBI
operated as “a manufacturer of brass and copper coil for industrial pur-
poses”20 before “an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was
brought against [it].”21
The problems for the Funds began when market conditions ad-
versely changed in late 2008. The change in conditions caused its
portfolio company, SBI, to be in technical breach of its loan covenants.
SBI sought relief from its creditors but was denied. Conditions wors-
ened for SBI. It subsequently failed to make a 4.5 million dollar
contribution to the New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry
17. Id. at 132-33.
18. The Court of Appeals could have articulated a standard that would be limited to
investor activities in an ERISA context.
19. Sun Capital Partners III, LP, 724 F.3d at 132.
20. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D. Mass. 2012) [hereinafter New Eng. Teamsters & Truck-
ing Indus. Pension Fund].
21. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 136 (1st Cir. 2013).
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Pension Fund. In due course, the Plan asserted its rights against SBI
and sought payment. The Plan also asserted its rights against the
Funds invoking ERISA’s control group legislation.
The Fund Organizers used a combination of LLCs, limited part-
nerships, and a holding company to effectuate the investment
structure at issue. Each layer in the overall structure was designed to
serve a particular purpose, such as limiting liability, securing financ-
ing, or holding assets. This complex investment structure, while legally
permissible under state law, did not go unnoticed upon the Court of
Appeals. The court commented that “[t]hese private equity funds en-
gaged in a particular type of investment approach [that is] to be
distinguished from mere stock holding or mutual fund investments.”22
However, despite the complex and multi-layered ownership structure,
it bears noting that the ultimate issue is relatively simple and straight-
forward: namely, whether a private equity fund should be held liable
for the withdrawal pension liability of one of its portfolio companies
when the private equity fund, directly or indirectly, engages in the op-
erations of the portfolio company.
The artificial separation of the structures, while permitted
under state law, would prove to be problematic under federal law. The
federal legislation at issue provides that, “under regulations prescribed
by the [PBGC],23 all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not
incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as em-
ployed by a single employer and all such trades and businesses as a
single employer.”24 Predictably, the Funds advanced the argument
that they are not engaged in a trade or business and thus are not sub-
ject to the mandate of the statute.
A. Operation of the Funds and Control Mechanisms
The Fund Organizers used three key control mechanisms to es-
tablish, oversee, and maintain control of the portfolio company’s
22. Id. at 134. “[A] mutual fund is an investment company, which, typically, is continu-
ously engaged in the issuance of its shares and stands ready at any time to redeem the
securities as to which it is the issuer; a closed-end investment company typically does not
issue shares after its initial organization except at infrequent intervals and does not stand
ready to redeem its shares. Because open-end investment companies will redeem their
shares, they must constantly issue securities to prevent shrinkage of assets. In contrast, the
capital structure of a closed-end company is similar to that of other corporations; if its
shareholders wish to sell, they must do so in the marketplace. Without any obligation to
redeem, closed-end companies need not continuously seek new capital.” Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 51 (1981) (internal quotes omitted).
23. This acronym stands for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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operations and policies. Leaving nothing to chance, the legal conse-
quence of these control mechanisms assured the Fund Organizers the
right and the power to control the activities and operations of the port-
folio company.
1. Use of Controlling Stake
First, the private equity fund organizer (“Fund Organizer”)
used its “controlling stakes in portfolio companies . . . to implement
restructuring and operational plans, build management teams, become
intimately involved in company operations, and otherwise cause
growth in the portfolio companies in which [the Funds] invest.”25 This
ability to use control figured prominently in the “private placement
memos to potential investors.”26 The Fund Organizer set investor ex-
pectation by communicating that the Funds would be able to control
the policies and operations of the portfolio company. Specifically, the
Fund Organizer stated that the Funds would “ha[ve] direct contractual
rights to substantially participate in or substantially influence the
management of operating companies . . . and . . . in the ordinary course
of [their businesses], actively exercis[e] such management rights with
respect to at least one of the operating companies in which [they in-
vest].”27 This level of control is critical to attract investors, to minimize
any risk associated with the investment, and to optimize the return on
investment upon the disposition of the investment.
2. Use of a Management Company
Next, the Fund Organizer employed the use of a management
company.28 The management company structure provided operational,
managerial, and oversight services to the Funds and enabled the
Funds to engage directly with the portfolio company. The management
company employed “about 123 professionals”29 and “acted as a middle-
man, providing SBI with employees and consultants from SCAI.”30 The
management company acted as a conduit between the investors and
the portfolio company, providing both parties with information, assess-
25. Sun Capital Partners III, LP, 724 F.3d at 134.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. It bears noting that, in an independent setting, buyers of management services are
free to select from a group of competitors. SBI did not have the opportunity to decide for
itself whether it needed a consultant. The consultant was forced upon SBI.
29. Sun Capital Partners III, LP, 724 F.3d at 133.
30. Id. at 136.
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ment, and expertise. The management company received a payment
directly from the portfolio company in exchange for providing services.
As a result of the payment, the Fund Organizer would credit the
amount otherwise due from the Funds for investment services pro-
vided by the management company to the portfolio company. This
crediting feature ensured that there was no duplication of costs be-
tween the investors and the portfolio company. Thus, every dollar paid
by the portfolio company to the Fund Organizer’s management com-
pany resulted in a corresponding credit that the Funds would receive
from the Fund Organizer.
3. Participation in Corporate Policy Making
and Operational Decisions
Finally, the Fund Organizer actively participated in the poli-
cymaking and operations of the portfolio company. The Court of
Appeals noted that “[n]umerous individuals with affiliations to various
Sun Capital entities . . . exerted substantial operation and managerial
control over [the portfolio company].”31 The Court of Appeals cited the
following examples as evidence of control and influence by the Fund
Organizers: “attend[ing] a ‘Jumpstart Meeting’”; approving “the hiring
of three [portfolio company] salesmen”; approving “the hiring of a [com-
puter systems] consultant”; “discussing possible acquisitions, capital
expenditures, and working capital levels”; receiving “email chains dis-
cussing liquidity, possible mergers, dividend payouts, and concerns
about how to drive revenue growth at [the portfolio company]”; and “re-
ceiving weekly flash reports [containing] . . . key financial data, market
activity, sales opportunities, meeting notes and action items.”32
The heightened level of participation by private equity funds or
equity fund organizers in the policy decisions and operations of the
portfolio company is a common feature in most private equity invest-
ments. One writer notes,
After the acquisition, the general partners in the private equity
fund are actively involved in the strategic direction of the portfolio
company. They normally have operational control over the company
through their control of its board of directors. The general partners
act as advisors to the portfolio company’s management and as
members of the company’s board of directors, and draw on their ex-
pertise in corporate restructurings and their contacts throughout
the industry to assist in creating value. However, when needed, the
private equity partners can use their control to swiftly alter com-
31. Id.
32. Id.
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pany policies, remove underperforming executives, or challenge
management to perform better.33
The control mechanisms and the level of participation by the
Fund Organizers in Sun Capital Partners was part of an intended
structural design feature to ensure complete control and domination
over the portfolio company. This type of operational engineering and
subsequent involvement by private equity fund organizers is atypical
within a traditional investor environment. Moreover, this type of oper-
ational engineering goes beyond “mere stock holding”34 by an investor,
crossing instead well onto the grounds of active participation. The IRS
maintains that “mere personal investment activities never constitute
carrying on a trade or business, no matter how much of one’s time or of
one’s employees’ time they may occupy.”35
At the time the labor statute was enacted, LLC’s were in a nas-
cent stage and LLPs were not in contemplation by state legislators.36
Congress enacted Section 1302, the applicable labor statute, in 1974,37
during a period when traditional investors did not engage in the actual
operations of the invested activity. Indeed, one of the key distinguish-
ing features of modern private equity investment from traditional
investors is the degree of involvement, direct or indirect, that equity
funds exert in most of the daily operational decisions of its portfolio
investment company.
Opponents of the Sun Capital Partners decision may advance
several arguments in support of the position that they are not engaged
in a trade or business. First, they may argue these arrangements are
legally permissible. Every state has enabling legislation granting in-
vestors the privilege of limited liability, so long as statutory minimum
requirements are met.38 Second, opponents may argue that substantial
economic benefits are realized through private equity activity. Specifi-
33. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The
Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219,
223 (2009), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/76.1/
76_1_Masulis_Thomas.pdf.
34. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2013).
35. Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941).
36. The first state to adopt an LLP statute was Texas in 1991. See CHRISTINE A. HURT
ET AL., BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001) 3 (2014).
37. Pub. L. 93-406, Title IV, § 4002, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 1004.
38. Many states simply require the filing of a form, which discloses basic information
and the payment of a fee in exchange for accessing the privilege of limited liability, be it in
the form of a corporation, limited liability company, or a limited liability partnership. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §§ 1.20-1.24 (2008) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1984); Del. Code Ann.
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cally, they may cite to the positive effects of increased economic and
employment activity in support of this position. Finally, opponents
may argue that the law prohibiting participation by limited partners
was itself explicitly relaxed to allow limited partners to participate in
the undertakings of the underlying investment. This last point is a
compelling argument that deserves additional attention.
Private equity firms can be expected to cite to the Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act’s39 “recommended”40 approach to limited
liability.41 Specifically, Section 303 provides: “A limited partner is not
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or other-
wise, for an obligation of the limited partnership solely by reason of
being a limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the
management and control of the limited partnership.” Admittedly, this
is a persuasive argument in that the revised policy merely harmonizes
the treatment of LPs with its sister entities, LLPs and LLCs.
Private equity firms will also point to the comments in Section
303. These comments explain the rationale for relaxation in the partic-
ipation standard for limited partners. Specifically, the comments to
Section 303 indicate that the section provides a full, status-based lia-
bility shield for each limited partner, “even if the limited partner
participates in the management and control of the limited partner-
ship.” The section thus eliminates the so-called “control rule” with
respect to personal liability for entity obligations and brings limited
partners into parity with LLC members, LLP partners, and corporate
shareholders.42
The drafters of the revised Section 303 justify the change in pol-
icy by acknowledging that “[i]n a world with LLPs, LLCs, and most
importantly, LLLPs, the control rule has become an anachronism. This
Act therefore takes the next logical step in the evolution of the limited
partner’s liability shield and renders the control rule extinct.”43
Granted, the policy of state legislatures has been one toward relaxation
tit. 8, § 391 (2014); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1.10 (2011); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 104-104-A
(2008); Cal. Corp. Code § 200 (2015); Cal. Corp. Code § 17702.01 (2014).
39. See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT OF 2001, § 303 cmts. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2001), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Limited%20Part
nership/ulpa_final_2014.pdf (amended in 2013).
40. See id.
41. As of January 2015, nineteen jurisdictions have adopted part or all of this model
statute, including Section 303, which shields a limited partner from liability “even if the
limited partner participates in the management and control of the limited partnership.” Id.;
see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 215/303 (2005).
42. See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT OF 2001, supra note 39.
43. See id.
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and permissiveness of participation by the investor. However, one
must exercise caution when distinguishing among the varying policy
objectives.
What it means to be an investor for purposes of a limited liabil-
ity analysis is a fundamentally different question from whether an
investor is engaged in an activity constituting a trade or business; and
therein lies the difference. Sun Fund’s argument that it is a “mere pas-
sive investor”44 confounds state and federal policy objectives. The
determination of whether one is an investor under state law principles
is designed to furnish to investors the flexibility of pooling capital re-
sources and securing the privilege of limited liability. In contrast, the
determination of whether one is an investor for purposes of Title 29, let
alone Title 26, is irrelevant and blind to the labels of LLC, LLP, and
LP, because the relevant inquiry under the labor statute is not
whether one is an investor. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the
activity engaged in constitutes a “trade or business.”
II. PRIVATE EQUITY
The private equity investment sector is an exclusive and eco-
nomically significant sector. Private equity is characterized by two
broad sectors: the buyout sector and venture capital sector.45 “Virtually
all private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships, with
private equity firms serving as the general partners (GP) of the funds,
and large institutional investors and wealthy individuals providing the
bulk of the capital as limited partners (LPs).”46 Unlike ordinary inves-
tors who invest directly in the particular enterprise, private equity
investors invest in a pooled fund, which then invests and operates the
targeted portfolio company.47 Throughout its life cycle, “[a][private eq-
44. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 132 (1st Cir. 2013).
45. John R. LeClaire et al., Growth Equity – The Crossroads Sector Comes to the Fore,
GOODWIN PROCTER (July 31, 2013), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newslet-
ters/Private-Equity-Update/2013/Growth-Equity-The-Crossroads-Sector-Comes-to-the-
Fore.aspx?article=1.
46. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2303, 2304 (2010), http://gsm.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/file-attachments/
metrickyasuda2010.pdf.
47. SCOTT W. NAIDECH, PRACTICAL LAW CO., PRIVATE EQUITY FUND FORMATION 2
(2011), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/3d5a9a56-734c-4d30-a5e4-0a8c593967
ab/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/12cdc9fc-964d-4b0e-a0d4-c48ce9dd7c2f/Naidech_
PrivateEquityFundFormation_Nov11.pdf. It is not uncommon for private equity funds to
use a series of related subsidiaries or brother-sister entities as it deploys the moneys re-
ceived to acquire the target portfolio company. Id.
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uity] fund goes through a number of overlapping stages.”48 In form, the
various entities of the equity fund are separated by layers of common
ownership to achieve strategic objectives. But in substance, they are
collectively organized and operated with the assistance of a profes-
sional management team to direct the operations of the targeted
portfolio company for the purpose of maximizing investor
profitability.49
Two key investment strategies distinguish private equity in-
vesting from regular investing – debt and control.
In a typical deal, a private-equity firm buys a company, using some
of its own money and some borrowed money. . . . [The private equity
investment] model encourages firms to borrow as much as possible,
since, just as with a mortgage, the less money you put down, the
bigger your potential return on investment.50
The other key investment strategy is control. Private equity
firms will secure organizational and operational control, upon acquir-
ing the portfolio company, to enable the firm to make immediate
changes as private equity firms seek to control costs while maximizing
profitability.51
The role of private equity investment is significant to the econ-
omy. “Private equity firms invested $443 billion in more than 2,360
U.S. based companies in 2013. These companies employ approximately
7.5 million people. And the value of PE-backed IPOs since 2001 is well
over a trillion dollars.”52 The private equity industry is “an important
asset class with over $1 trillion under management, two thirds of
48. Cody Boyte, A Primer on the Structure of Private Equity Firms, AXIAL (Mar. 19,
2014), http://www.axial.net/forum/primer-structure-private-equity-firms/. The overlapping
stages are:
Organization/Formation (Year 0);
Fund Raising (Years 0 to 2);
Deal Sourcing and Investing (Years 1 to 4);
Portfolio Management (Years 2 to 7); and
Exiting Investments (Years 3 to 10).
49. Professional management teams may consist of small businesses with only a few
employees, or large financial conglomerates. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and
Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228,
1238 (2014).
50. James Surowiecki, Private Inequity, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/private-inequity.
51. Controlling costs by eliminating unneeded resources is one way for private equity
firms to maximize profits. Paul H. Rubin, A Tutorial for the President on ‘Profit Maximiza-
tion’, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230361050
4577419970054445432.
52. Private Equity Investment Drives Broad Economic Growth, PRIV. EQUITY GROWTH
CAP. COUNCIL, http://www.pegcc.org/education/growth/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
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which is managed by BO53 funds. Furthermore, fundraising is growing
fast from $5 billion in 1980 to $400 billion in 2006.”54 However, there is
considerable debate concerning the virtues55 and the vices56 of private
equity investment activity. The scholarship is itself fractured and
inconclusive.
One paper in support of private equity investment activity ad-
vances the claim that “[t]he raw data indicate that employees of firms
that get acquired by PE investors are subsequently employed for
longer durations than workers employed elsewhere.”57 This statement
negates claims by opponents of private equity investment activity that
such investment activity has a harmful effect on the acquired target
company and its employee labor pool. Another paper, touting itself as
“the first to take advantage of a new research-quality cash flow data
set,”58 advances two dramatic conclusions concerning private equity
fund investments. First, the authors assert that “it seems likely that
buyout funds have outperformed public markets, particularly the S&P
53. “BO” is an acronym used to describe a buyout fund.
54. Ludovic Phalippou, Investing in Private Equity Funds: A Survey, 2 RES. FOUND.
CFA INST. 2, 14 (2007), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2470/rflr.v2.n2.4626.
55. See Masulis & Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?, supra note 33, at 260.
Among the benefits cited are that “[p]rivate equity offers several attractive benefits to help
offset . . . corporate governance problems . . . [by concentrating] share ownership . . . with
the creation of a controlling, monitoring blockholder . . . plac[ing] control in the hands of
directors representing large fractional owners in the firm . . . ensur[ing] that these directors
are financially sophisticated and strongly motivated to carefully monitor senior managers
. . . [and providing] boards at private-equity portfolio companies [with] the power and incen-
tives to discipline and if necessary replace senior management.” Id.
56. See Ludovic Phalippou, Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 147, 152-54 (2009) (discussing how investors may not be aware of hidden fees in
private equity transactions and suggesting that fees should be computed by reference to
alternative performance measures using “an internal rate of return” model and a “multiple”
model).
57. Ashwini Agrawal & Prasanna Tambe, Private Equity, Technological Investment,
and Labor Outcomes 17 (Working Paper 2013), http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/
FOM/papers/FOM-Session5_2.20p_AGRAWAL.pdf.
58. Robert S. Harris et al., Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 17874, 2012), http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/
steven.kaplan/research/HJK.pdf. The authors of the paper call into question numerous ear-
lier studies by implicitly stating that the data of many of these earlier studies is stale and
outdated. The authors of this study make the following claim: “Our research highlights the
importance of high quality data for understanding private equity and the returns it provides
to investors. Some of the existing papers in the academic literature have relied upon data
whose reliability has recently been questioned. Most previously published papers also have
focused on funds raised up until the mid- or late-1990s. The enormous growth in investor
allocations to private equity funds since the late 1990s has created a need for a re-evalua-
tion of private equity performance. This paper is the first to take advantage of a new
research-quality cash flow data set from Burgiss, using data as of March 2011.” Id.
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500, net of fees and carried interest, in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.”59
Second, the authors also note that “VC60 funds outperformed public
markets substantially until the late 1990s.”61 These claims praise the
virtues of private equity investment and its positive results on society
in terms of employment and economic growth.
One private equity firm engaging in a hypothetical Q&A session
asked the following question: “How do private equity firms improve
company performance?”62 In response, it answered:
To succeed in improving the performance of a portfolio company a
private equity firm needs to supply a great deal more than just fi-
nancial creativity. Developing organic revenue growth is key to
securing increased value within a company. To further enhance a
company’s performance it is also crucial to undertake substantial
operational improvements, cost and waste reductions, improving
the company’s competitiveness, product repositioning and ability to
enter new markets, as well as the development and execution of a
sound business strategy.63
This response is illuminating. It conveys to readers an active
involvement by many private equity firms in the operations of their
target portfolio company. The communication strategy behind state-
ments such as this one conveys to potential investors both an obvious
and an understated message. This statement must be analyzed not
only for its obvious content but also for its persuasive value to potential
investors.64 Not only does the statement suggest something more than
mere “financial creativity,” it illustrates a communication strategy by
equity firms to convey to targeted investors the investment, manage-
59. Id.
60. “VC” is an acronym used to describe a buyout fund. It specifically refers to venture
capital.
61. Harris et al., supra note 58, at 28. The paper goes on to note: “Since 2000, the
average VC fund has underperformed public markets by about 5% over the life of the fund.”
Id.
62. Key Facts About Private Equity, CVC CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://www.cvc.com/Our-
Industry/Key-Facts-About-Private-Equity.htmx (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
63. Id.
64. See Carlo V. di Florio, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examina-
tions, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Private Equity International’s Private Fund Compliance
(May 3, 2011), 20120418P NYCBAR 43 (discussing potential conflicts during the fund-rais-
ing stage); see also William J. Holstein, The Very Big Business of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/business/office-space-armchair-mba-
the-very-big-business-of-private-equity.html (“Our investors know as much, if not more,
about our investments and returns than do public companies’ investors. We have a more
limited audience, so it’s easier to communicate with them. A firm like ours might have 75 or
80 investors. That’s a target audience that’s easier to communicate with.”).
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rial, and operational philosophies of the respective private equity
firms.
Another proponent of private equity writes that “the fundamen-
tal reason behind private equity’s growth and high rates of return is
something that has received little attention, perhaps because it’s so ob-
vious: the firms’ standard practice of buying businesses and then, after
steering them through a transition of rapid performance improvement,
selling them.”65 This statement is striking because of its clear admis-
sion that businesses are “steered,” thereby conveying an active
involvement by the private equity firm in the underlying operational
activities of the investment.
A KPMG research study further illustrates the nuances of the
“steering” argument. KPMG asked its research subjects the following
question: “Should private equity executives have operational or indus-
try sector experience?”66 Predictably, the reported response states, “The
results of our research show a high degree of consensus on this topic,
with private equity directors’ lack of operational or management expe-
rience seen as a weakness in the way they interact with portfolio
companies.”67 “Interaction” between private equity firm directors and
the underlying portfolio company is a commonplace occurrence in the
private equity industry. To the linguistic purist, the word “interact”
may not be the equivalent to “steering.” But when viewed through the
eyes of a reasonable investor, the word “interact” signals an appropri-
ate level of activity by the private equity firm to justify the risk of the
investment to an interested investor.
Private equity firms have also sought to legitimize their eco-
nomic and social impact by asserting that “[a]cademic studies have
shown that private equity investment and leverage has an overall posi-
tive impact on the financial performance and efficiency of companies,
especially since the transitional capital invested fills a critical gap
when capital markets are fragile.”68 They add that, “[u]ltimately, lever-
aged buy-outs of portfolio companies generate greater productivity,
promote employment and salary growth, and have a positive effect on
employee relations within the company.”69 They go on to add that
65. Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 2007), http://hbr.org/2007/09/the-strategic-secret-of-private-equity/ar/1 (empha-
sis added).
66. KPMG, WORKING WITH PRIVATE EQUITY PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 8 (Jan. 2013), http://
www.kpmg.com/GI/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/working-with-
private-equity.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Key Facts About Private Equity, supra note 62.
69. Id.
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“[s]uperior returns from private equity investments strengthen pen-
sion funds that provide benefits for millions of employees.”70
Nevertheless, private equity investment activity is reputed to
have destructive and disreputable characteristics. In response to the
traditional argument that investors in general, and private equity in
particular, help to grow markets and create job opportunities, one au-
thor writes:
In recent years, private equity funds have played an increasingly
important role in corporate acquisitions. Even though they have no
in-house expertise in particular industries, they may, in theory, ac-
quire a company for the long term and hire industry experts as
managers and ask them to upgrade its capabilities. However, in
practice, these funds usually have no intention to upgrade the ac-
quired company for the long term. They acquire firms with a view
to selling them on in three to five years after restructuring them
into profitability. Such restructuring, given the time horizon, usu-
ally involves cutting costs (especially sacking workers and
refraining from long-term investments), rather than raising capa-
bilities. Such restructuring is likely to hurt the long-term prospects
of the company by weakening its ability to generate productivity
growth. In the worst cases, private equity funds may acquire com-
panies with the explicit intention to engage in asset-stripping,
selling the valuable assets of a company without regard to its long-
term future.71
This statement reinforces the proposition that many private eq-
uity funds do not “merely invest” in their companies. Instead, this
statement asserts that private equity funds are regularly and substan-
tially engaged in the operational and organizational policies of the
underlying portfolio company.
Whether the speaker is a proponent or critic of private equity
investment, proponents and critics alike speak with a common voice in
the following respect – namely, that many private equity funds are reg-
ularly and substantially engaged in many of the activities of the
portfolio company.
A. Distinction Between Structural Roles
Another factor contributing to the significance of the private eq-
uity sector is its ability to successfully exploit the modernization of
business entity statutes. Private equity has seized upon a structural
distinction among the various business entity statutes. The distinction
70. Id.
71. HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT CAPITALISM 85-86 (2010).
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between investors in a corporation and investors in a limited partner-
ship, LLP, or LLC, reflects a fundamental policy change adopted by
state legislatures regarding the level of participation and control inves-
tors may have in the underlying entity. State laws allow investors to
maintain the legal fiction of separate entities despite common owner-
ship while permitting investors to actively manage the activities of
such entities through control mechanisms such as contract law, agency
law, and corporate law.72
One key distinction between investors in a corporation and in-
vestors in a limited partnership, LLP, or LLC, is the fact that the
organic law of a corporation prohibits shareholders from actively en-
gaging in the management, oversight, and operations of the
corporation. Historically, investors were not involved in the manage-
rial or operational activities of the invested companies. Corporate
investors remain structurally prohibited from engaging in the manage-
ment or operations of the corporation. MBCA Section 8.01(b) provides,
“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of,
and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under
the direction of, its board of directors.”73 Rejecting a shareholder’s de-
sire to participate in a liquidation proceeding, one court noted, “When
a statute provides that powers granted to a corporation shall be exer-
cised by any set of officers or any particular agents, such powers can be
exercised only by such officers or agents.”74 With the notable excep-
tions of Clark v. Dodge,75 and Galler v. Galler,76 corporate
shareholders, both public and closely-held, remain prohibited from
managing or overseeing the corporation.
In contrast, the organic laws of LLPs, LLCs, and now LPs, allow
for active participation by investors. The change in the structural rules
reflects the policy change by state legislatures regarding the level of
participation and control investors may exert in the entity. While state
laws allow investors the flexibility of maintaining a separate legal fic-
72. For example, MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 3.02 provides that “every corporation . . .
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out
its business and affairs,” while MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.22(b) provides that “a share-
holder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts of debts of the corporation . . . .” In
similar fashion, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006) § 105 provides:
“A limited liability company has . . . the power to do all things necessary or convenient to
carry on its activities.” While § 304 states that “the . . . liabilities of a limited liability com-
pany, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise are solely the . . . liabilities of the
company [and] do not become the . . . liabilities of a member or manager . . . .”
73. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1984).
74. Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86 (1880).
75. 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936).
76. 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964).
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tion among the entities, state laws should not promote the idea that
separation in form promotes separation in substance, especially when
doing so would frustrate public policy.
III. ANALYSIS OF TRADE OR BUSINESS
The labor statute at issue in Sun Capital Partners provides: “To
impose withdrawal liability on an organization other than the one obli-
gated to the [pension] Fund, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
organization must be under ‘common control’ with the obligated organ-
ization, and (2) the organization must be a trade or business.”77
Therefore, determining what is “common control”78 and what is a
“trade or business” is indispensable to establishing liability.
The phrase “common control” is not defined by the labor code.
Instead, readers are instructed to traverse through a dizzying array of
statutes and regulations before concluding that a clear definition is not
indicated.79 In the end, one arrives at the conclusion that common con-
trol means the common relationships existing between trades or
businesses that have parent-subsidiary relationships, brother-sister
relationships, or a combination of the two. The determination of “com-
mon control” is further complicated when one searches for a definition
for non-corporate entities, such as LLPs and LLCs. In this case, the
applicable statute contemplates that the determination of “common
control” is to be made “on principles similar to” corporate entities.
There is no case law either defining the scope or illustrating the appli-
cation of this particular clause. However, in McDougall v. Pioneer
Ranch Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that “the organization must be under ‘common control’ with the
obligated organization”80 before a finding of liability can be made.
Similarly, the phrase “trade or business” is also not defined by
the labor code. Instead, the labor code instructs readers to look to Sec-
tion 414(c) of the income tax code when establishing whether an
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b); Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Truck-
ing Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2013).
78. A complete analysis of “common control” is beyond the scope of this paper and will
be the topic of a future paper.
79. But see 29 C.F.R. § 779.221 (2011), which defines the phrase “common control” for
purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act as Applied to Retailers of Goods or Services by
splitting this phrase into its component parts and defining “ ‘control’ . . . as the act of fact of
controlling and ‘common’ . . . [as] ‘includ[ing] the sharing of control and it is not limited to
sole control or complete control by one person or corporation.” Id.
80. McDougall v. Pioneer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 494 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1098 (2008) (emphasis added).
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organization is a “trade or business” for purposes of the labor statute.81
Regrettably, the Internal Revenue Code itself does not define the term
“trade or business” for purposes of Section 414(c). Moreover, the phrase
“trade or business” as used within Section 414(c) itself has yet to be
interpreted by any court.
A dilemma thus arises: what is the intended meaning of the
phrase “trade or business” when not one, but two cross-referencing fed-
eral statutes invoke its use but are silent as to its meaning? And, does
the interpretation by a court of the phrase “trade or business” in one
context, income tax law in this case, mandate the same interpretation
in a labor law context?
To begin, there are over 1,000 references to the phrase trade or
business in the Internal Revenue Code. The intended meaning of
“trade or business” itself within Section 414(c) is undefined by the stat-
ute, by the underlying regulations, or by the common law. “The
interplay among the relevant Code sections does not permit, in this
context, an interpretation that harmonizes all and leaves no loose
ends.”82 Regulators and litigants alike will be forced to examine ancil-
lary interpretations and common law precedents to inform their
inquiry and their judgment.
Three Supreme Court cases have considered the question of
what constitutes a trade or business for purposes of business deduc-
tions under the Income Tax Code. Admittedly, the individuals in all
three cases sought to access the benefit of a tax deduction instead of
avoiding the burden of a pension liability. Nonetheless, the analysis of
the three cases can be instructive in identifying elements necessary to
determine if a trade or business activity exists, and if so, to what ex-
tent these elements are determinative to the finding of a trade or
business.
81. 29 U.S.C. §1301(b)(1) (2012) instructs that “[t]he regulations prescribed under the
preceding sentence shall be consistent and coextensive with regulations prescribed for simi-
lar purposes by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 414(c) of Title 26.”
82. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064, 1072
(5th Cir. 1984).
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A. Proposition No. 1: “Carrying on a Trade or Business Requires an
Active and Influential Involvement in the Portfolio Company
and Excludes Merely Recording and Monitoring
the Activities of the Portfolio Company”
In Higgins v. Commissioner,83 the Supreme Court examined for
the first time the question of whether a taxpayer was engaged in a
trade or business. The taxpayer sought to deduct investment expenses
incurred in producing investment income for the year under examina-
tion. The issue in this case was whether the taxpayer was carrying on a
trade or business and thus eligible to deduct the investment expenses
against his income. The applicable tax statute at the time provided
that “[i]n computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions
. . . [a]ll the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.”84
The taxpayer in Higgins is an investor of substantial means
with “a fortune of $35,000,000 or more, part of it in real estate and part
in stocks and bonds.”85 The Supreme Court describes him as a “tax-
payer . . . devot[ing] a considerable portion of his time to the oversight
of his interests and hir[ing] others to assist him in offices rented for
that purpose.”86 The Supreme Court noted that the taxpayer “did not
participate directly or indirectly in the management of the corpora-
tions in which he held stock or bonds.”87 The Court further noted that
the taxpayer “merely kept records and collected interest and dividends
from his securities, through managerial attention for his
investments.”88
The taxpayer in Higgins argued that he was engaged in carry-
ing on a trade or business and therefore eligible to deduct his
investment expenses. The IRS rejected this argument, stating that
mere investment activities do not constitute a trade or business.89 In
analyzing the facts in Higgins, the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween an investor who “merely” manages, without more, one’s
83. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
84. Id. at 214.
85. Higgins v. Comm’r, 111 F.2d 795, 796 (2nd Cir. 1940). The Second Circuit’s descrip-
tion reduces the level of abstraction and gives context to the issue in dispute. Id. at 796. The
Second Circuit concluded that the taxpayer “is not engaged in any business, unless the man-
agement of his fortune be deemed a business.” Id.
86. 312 U.S. at 213.
87. Id. at 214.
88. Id. at 218.
89. Id. at 216.
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investments from an investor who is actively engaged in managing the
underlying trade or business activity.
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was not involved in
a trade or business as that phrase was used in a tax context, and thus,
did not qualify for a tax deduction. The Supreme Court, noting the var-
iants and complexities that individual circumstances may present,
stated, “To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are ‘carrying
on a business’ requires an examination of the facts in each case.”90
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 212 in 1942 in response to the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Higgins denying investors a deduction for
investment related expenses.91 Section 212 authorizes income tax de-
ductions for individuals who incur expenses in the production of
income.92 Unlike Section 162, which authorizes deductions incurred by
a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business, Congress eliminated any
requirement for a “trade or business” in the newly enacted I.R.C. § 212.
By doing so, Congress expressly recognizes and distinguishes between
the conduct of active and passive taxpayers. This distinction in the
statutory framework between Section 162 and Section 212 remains to-
day. The history and jurisprudence of Section 162 contemplates
taxpayers actively “carrying on a trade or business.”93 In contrast, the
history and jurisprudence of Section 212 contemplates only that tax-
payers “produce, collect, or maintain property for the production of
income,”94 thereby eliminating the need for any active conduct by the
taxpayer in the underlying activity.
The income tax code further distinguishes deductions between
investors, traders, and dealers. Investors “are not eligible for IRC sec-
tion 162’s trade or business deductions and . . . will deduct most of
their investment expenses under IRC section 212 as ‘below the line’
itemized deductions.”95 In contrast, traders and brokers can deduct,
“under IRC section 162 for ‘all the ordinary and necessary expenses
90. Id. at 217.
91. 26 U.S.C. § 212 (2012) (previously section 23(a) in the 1939 Income Tax Code, ad-
ded by ch. 619, § 121, 56 Stat. 798 (1942)). See H.R. REP. No. 2333, at 74-76 (1942), S. REP.
No. 1631 at 87-88 (1942).
92. 26 U.S.C. § 212 captioned “Expenses for production of income” provides that “[i]n
the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the production or collection of
income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the pro-
duction of income; or (3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax.”
93. See Frank v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 511, 513 (1953).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 212.
95. Shu-Yi Oei, A Structural Critique of Trader Taxation, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 1013, 1020
(2008) (footnote omitted).
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paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business.’ IRC section 162 deductions . . . are ‘above the line’ deduc-
tions that reduce adjusted gross income.”96
B. Proposition No. 2: Something More Than Simply an Investment
Return is Required – A Plus Factor
In a second case, Whipple v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court
once again examined the question of whether a taxpayer was engaged
in a trade or business. This time, the court examined the question in
context to determine whether a shareholder who advanced loans to his
controlled company was entitled to a bad debt deduction when the
loans became worthless.97
The statute at issue98 allows a deduction for bad debts incurred
by the taxpayer. However, the statute contemplates two different in-
come tax treatments for bad debts depending on whether the debt is
classified as a business bad debt or a nonbusiness bad debt. Business
96. Id. at 1019.
97. Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193, 194-95 (1963). The taxpayer advanced the argu-
ment that he was engaged in three separate activities – organizing, financing, and
operating. Id.
98. See 26 U.S.C. § 23(k)(1) (1952) (providing “[d]ebts which become worthless within
the taxable year; or (in the discretion of the Commissioner) a reasonable addition to a re-
serve for bad debts; and when satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in part, the
Commissioner may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess of the part charged off
within the taxable year, as a deduction. This paragraph shall not apply in the case of a
taxpayer, other than a bank, as defined in section 104, with respect to a debt evidenced by a
security as defined in paragraph (3) of this subsection. This paragraph shall not apply in the
case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation, with respect to a non-business debt, as defined
in paragraph (4) of this subsection. In the case of a mutual savings bank not having capital
stock represented by shares, a domestic building and loan association, and a cooperative
bank without capital stock organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit,
the reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts shall be determined with due regard to
the amount of the taxpayer’s surplus or bad debt reserves existing at the close of December
31, 1951. In the case of a taxpayer described in the preceding sentence, the reasonable addi-
tion to a reserve for bad debts for any taxable year shall in no case be less than the amount
determined by the taxpayer as the reasonable addition for such year; except that the
amount determined by the taxpayer under this sentence shall not be greater than the lesser
of (A) the amount of its net income for the taxable year, computed without regard to this
sub- section, or (B) the amount by which 12 per centum of the total deposits or withdrawable
accounts of its depositors at the close of such year exceeds the sum of its surplus, undivided
profits, and reserves at the beginning of the taxable year.”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 23(k)(4)
(1952) (stating, “(4) Non-business debts. In the case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation,
if a non-business debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the loss resulting there-
from shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a
capital asset held for not more than 6 months. The term “non-business debt” means a debt
other than a debt evidenced by a security as defined in paragraph (3) and other than a debt
the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer’s trade or business.”).
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bad debts are granted favorable treatment and deductible in full, pro-
vided they were incurred in a trade or business.99 In contrast,
nonbusiness bad debts are accorded less favorable treatment by being
subject to statutory deduction limitations.100
Over a period of three years, from 1949 to 1952, the taxpayer
created fifteen different corporations, one of which, Mission Orange, is
the corporation at issue.101 The taxpayer “made sizeable cash advances
to Mission Orange in 1952 and 1953.”102 An outstanding debt of
$56,975.10 eventually “became worthless in 1953 and is in issue
here.”103
The taxpayer in Whipple claimed a bad debt deduction104 for the
outstanding debt, arguing that he “was in the business of organizing,
promoting, managing and financing corporations, general financing
and lending of money, operating a bottling business, or all three.”105
The taxpayer advanced the argument that, as a result of these activi-
ties, he was engaged in a trade or business and thus entitled to deduct
the loans as a business bad debt. The IRS countered, arguing that the
taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business. According to the IRS,
the loans are a nonbusiness bad debt and the deduction is limited.
The Supreme Court reviewed the case and held for the Commis-
sioner. The Supreme Court reasoned:
Devoting one’s time and energies to the affairs of a corporation is
not of itself, and without more, a trade or business of the person so
engaged. Though such activities may produce income, profit or gain
in the form of dividends or enhancement in the value of an invest-
ment, this return is distinctive to the process of investing and is
generated by the successful operation of the corporation’s business
99. Whipple, 373 U.S. at 194.
100. Id.
101. Id. “Prior to 1941 petitioner was a construction superintendent and an estimator
for a lumber company but during that year and over the next several ones he was instru-
mental in forming and was a member of a series of partnerships engaged in the construction
or construction supply business. In 1949 and 1950 he was an original incorporator of seven
corporations, some of which were successors to the partnerships, and in 1951 he sold his
interest in the corporations along with his equity in five others in the rental and construc-
tion business, the profit on the sales being reported as long-term capital gains. In 1951 and
1952 he formed eight new corporations, one of which was Mission Orange Bottling Co. of
Lubbock, Inc., bought the stock of a corporation known as Mason Root Beer 3 and acquired
an interest in a related vending machine business. From 1951 to 1953 he also bought and
sold land, acquired and disposed of a restaurant and participated in several oil ventures.”
Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 196-97.
105. Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193, 197 (1963).
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as distinguished from the trade or business of the taxpayer him-
self.106 When the only return is that of an investor, the taxpayer
has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he is engaged in
a trade or business since investing is not a trade or business and
the return to the taxpayer, though substantially the product of his
services, legally arises not from his own trade or business but from
that of the corporation.107
The Supreme Court noted that, “[a]bsent substantial additional
evidence, furnishing management and other services to corporations
for a reward not different from that flowing to an investor in those
corporations is not a trade or business under s23(k)(4).”108
In light of Whipple, a reasonable argument may be advanced
that the pecuniary rewards private equity investment is designed to
generate provide private equity firms with financial returns beyond
the mere appreciation in the investment. Specifically, private equity
firms charge four principal fees: management fees, transaction fees,
monitoring fees, and carried interest.109 Three of these fees – manage-
ment fees, transaction fees, and monitoring fees – represent payments
for something more than the mere appreciation in the investment.
Only carried interest is based on the performance level of the asset and
represents a payment for the appreciation of the investment.110 Car-
ried interest is generally only paid to the Fund Organizer after a
specified hurdle rate has been satisfied.111 The payment of the fixed
fees to the Fund Organizer represents a payment for “something more”
than the appreciation in the value of the investment.112 Ordinary in-
vestors do not enjoy the advantage of a payment of fixed fees
(regardless of whether the portfolio company is profitable or not). Ordi-
nary investors only receive a payment in the event of appreciation.
One court observed:
106. In contrast, private equity has a return plus component. The plus being the 2% fee
and the 8% hurdle rate. To earn these amounts, the private equity firms must be active in
the business, thus they are in a trade or business.
107. Whipple, 373 U.S. at 202.
108. Id. at 203.
109. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 46, at 2305.
110. Proponents contend that this aligns the interests of the money managers with their
clients. Lawrence Delevingne, CNBC Explains: Carried Interest, CNBC (Mar 4, 2014), http:/
/www.cnbc.com/2014/03/04/cnbc-explains-carried-interest.html.
111. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 46, at 2312.
112. See Ludovic Phalippou et al., Private Equity Portfolio Company Fees 14 (Univ. of
Oxford, Working Paper, 2015), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/Private-Equity-Portfolio-Company-Fees.pdf (arguing that the various portfolio fees are
“ex-post discretionary compensation items for GPs”).
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[A] rational investor would not make an investment with a negative
expected rate of return, or an expected rate of return materially be-
low the rate they could earn elsewhere with the same risk. A
rational investor would consider, among other things, all fees and
costs associated with a proposed business or investment transac-
tion in order to determine whether there was a reasonable
possibility of profit.113
This statement by the court is consistent with portfolio investment the-
ory, which recognizes, “[i]n a standard model of the portfolio choice, . . .
a security is rationally purchased by an investor only if its returns co-
vary positively with the investor’s marginal utility.”114 According to
investment theory, rational investors are not prone to make payments
without expecting a return on investment. That return is the private
equity engaging in the management of the underlying investment.
Thus, a finding of a trade or business is justified whenever a private
equity firm engages in the operations of the underlying portfolio com-
pany in exchange for a fixed fee beyond the mere appreciation of the
investment.
C. Proposition No. 3: A Direct and Active Involvement is Required
by the Taxpayer in the Underlying Activity115
In a third case, Commissioner v. Groetzinger,116 the Supreme
Court examined, yet again, the question of whether a taxpayer was
engaged in a trade or business. This time, however, the Court ex-
amined the question in a gambling context. Specifically, the issue in
Groetzinger was “whether a full-time gambler who makes wagers
solely for his own account is engaged in a ‘trade or business,’ within the
meaning of [Section] 162.”117 Hanging in the balance for the taxpayer
was a deduction for gambling losses incurred by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer “worked for 20 years . . . when his position was
terminated in February 1978. During the remainder of that year, the
taxpayer busied himself with parimutuel wagering, primarily on grey-
hound races.”118 The record indicates that the taxpayer “went to the
113. Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 49,
188 (D. Mass. 2010).
114. Brian J. Henderson & Neil D. Pearson, The Dark Side of Financial Innovation 3
(EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342654.
115. See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 n.6 (1987) ( “Some sections of the Code,
however, do define the term [“trade or business”] for limited purposes. See . . . §§ 502(b) and
513(b), 26 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) and 513(b) (exempt organizations)”).
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id. at 24.
118. Id.
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track 6 days a week for 48 weeks [during] 1978, [spending] a substan-
tial amount of time studying racing forms, programs, and other
materials. The taxpayer devoted from 60 to 80 hours each week to
these gambling-related endeavors . . . gambl[ing] solely for his own ac-
count. He had no other profession or type of employment.”119
As a result of his gambling activities, the taxpayer incurred a
net gambling loss of $2,032, earning $70,000 in gambling winnings,
and sustaining $72,032 in gambling losses. However, the taxpayer re-
ported,120 but never claimed the $2,032 gambling loss as a deduction
on his income tax return. On audit, the IRS determined that the tax-
payer’s gambling winnings of $70,000 were a tax preference item for
AMT purposes and included the winnings in income for AMT purposes,
thereby triggering a total tax deficiency of $2,522. However, the IRS
did not allow the taxpayer to claim a deduction of $72,032 in gambling
losses on the theory that the gambling losses were not incurred in a
trade or business.121 The taxpayer disagreed with the IRS, sued and
prevailed in Tax Court and again in the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari to resolve a split in the
circuits. The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he
phrase “trade or business” has been in [Section] 162(a) and in that sec-
tion’s predecessors for many years. Indeed, the phrase is common in
the Code, for it appears in over 50 sections and 800 subsections and in
hundreds of places in proposed and final income tax regulations.”122
The Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he concept thus has a well-
known and almost constant presence on our tax-law terrain [and]
[d]espite this, the Code has never contained a definition of the words
“trade or business” for general application, and no regulation has been
issued expounding its meaning for all purposes.”123
The Supreme Court examined carefully the facts in Groetzinger,
noting in particular the substantial time, financial commitment, re-
search conducted, and the decision process undertaken by the
taxpayer. In a critical passage, the Supreme Court writes “that if one’s
gambling activity is pursued full time, in good faith, and with regular-
ity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere
119. Id.
120. Groetzinger reported the loss on Schedule E, but never carried the loss amount to
the face of Form 1040 to be claimed as a loss deduction.
121. Implicit in the IRS’s argument is its contention that the gambling losses were non-
deductible personal expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 262. Section 262 reads, “Except as
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses.”
122. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987).
123. Id.
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hobby, it is a trade or business within the meaning of the statutes with
which we are here concerned.”124 Without explicitly declaring a stan-
dard for analysis for determining the presence of a “trade or business,”
the Supreme Court’s dicta offered guidance to future litigants. The Su-
preme Court added that a combination of “[c]onstant and large-scale
effort . . . [s]kill . . . [and] livelihood” elevates an activity from a mere
hobby to a trade or business.125
In the end, the Supreme Court held for the taxpayer, reasoning
that he was engaged in a trade or business. The Supreme court noted
the limitation in interpreting the clause, “trade or business” by stating
that “[o]ur task in this case is to ascertain the meaning of the phrase as
it appears in the sections of the Code with which we are here con-
cerned.”126 The Supreme Court expressly rejected a reading of the
phrase “trade or business” that limited it to the provision of goods or
services reasoning that “[i]n any event, while the offering of goods and
services usually would qualify the activity as a trade or business, this
factor, it seems to us, is not an absolute prerequisite.”127
Groetzinger is significant because it demonstrates the Court’s
acceptance of a direct and personal involvement by the taxpayer in a
trade or business. The Supreme Court noted,
We accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the
taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regu-
larity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the
activity must be for income or profit. A sporadic activity, a hobby, or
an amusement diversion does not qualify.128
Applying this reasoning to private equity firms leads to the reasonable
conclusion that private equity firms are engaged in a trade or business.
For instance, private equity firms are involved with “continuity and
regularity” in the operations of the portfolio company. Additionally, the
private equity firm’s primary, if not sole, purpose for engaging in the
activity is for the production of “income or profit.” And finally, it is be-
yond any reasonable contemplation that private equity investing
amounts to “[a] sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement.” On the
contrary, $443 billion in more than 2,360 U.S. companies is a far cry
from a hobby. Applying Groetzinger, these factors support the conclu-
sion that private equity firms are engaged in a trade or business when
124. Id. at 35.
125. Id. at 36
126. Id. at 27.
127. Id. at 34.
128. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
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they provide expertise, consulting, financial engineering, or assistance
to the target portfolio company.
D. Synthesis of the Three Supreme Court Cases
Each one of the three Supreme Court cases interpreting the
phrase “trade or business” advances important propositions that are
acutely relevant to private equity investment activity.
Higgins advances the proposition that merely recording and
monitoring the activities of the portfolio company, without more, does
not amount to a trade or business activity. Groetzinger advances the
proposition that active conduct satisfies the trade or business standard
when the activity is pursued with “continuity and regularity and that
the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for
income or profit.”129 Taken together, these two cases require individu-
als who seek to invoke the benefits of a trade or business to have a
direct, active, and substantial engagement in the underlying activity.
Unlike ordinary investors, private equity firms are directly in-
volved in the target investment. In this regard, private equity fund
organizers are different from ordinary investors.  Ordinary investors
do not engage in the policy and decision-making function of the in-
vested activity. In contrast, private equity fund organizers are active in
the policy and decision-making function of the target investment. Ordi-
nary investors do not make hiring or firing decisions on behalf of the
target investment, nor do they attend “jump-start meetings.” As noted
by one study, “Private equity investors provide valuable services (time,
contacts, reputation) in addition to their cash investments.”130 The re-
lentless participation by many private equity funds in establishing the
policies, managing the operations, and even in lending reputational
credence to the portfolio company, are all activities yielding to the con-
clusion that private equity firms are engaged in a trade or business.
Whipple advances the proposition that something more than
simply an investment return is required for an activity to constitute a
trade or business.131 In this regard, it bears noting that ordinary inves-
tors earn a return through two sources: dividend income and
investment growth.  In contrast, private equity firms earn “something
more than simply an investment return.” In addition to any dividend
income they may receive while holding the investment and any gains
they may realize upon disposing of the investment, private equity
129. Id.
130. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 46, at 2316.
131. Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193, 193 (1963).
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firms charge four principal fees: management fees, carried interest,
transaction fees, and monitoring fees.132 Three of these fees are fixed
fees and are paid to the Equity Fund regardless of the portfolio com-
pany’s performance.133 Only one fee, carried interest, is a variable fee
and is subject to payment based on performance standards. The design
and structure of the three fixed fees are calculated to provide private
equity firms with a guaranteed return, regardless of the performance
of the underlying investment - a luxury ordinary investors simply do
not enjoy.
E. Invoking Not-for-Profit Analysis as a Guide in Determining
Whether an Activity is a Trade or Business
Examining the not-for-profit literature provides valuable in-
sight when seeking additional guidance as to how courts evaluate
when an activity constitutes a trade or business. Section 501(a) of the
income tax code exempts qualifying not-for-profit organizations from
income taxation.134  However, when a not-for-profit organization en-
gages in a trade or business activity, then the activity itself is subject
to income tax. Specifically, the income tax code imposes an unrelated
business income tax on the earnings “derived by any organization from
any unrelated trade or business . . . [which is] regularly carried on” by
the not-for-profit organization.135
The income tax code defines “ ‘unrelated trade or business’ [to]
mean[ ] . . . any trade or business the conduct of which is not substan-
tially related . . . to the exercise or performance by such organization of
its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting
the basis for its exemption . . . .”136 The income tax regulations indicate
that, “[i]n determining whether trade or business from which a partic-
ular amount of gross income derives is regularly carried on . . . regard
must be had to the frequency and continuity with which the activities
productive of the income are conducted and the manner in which they
are pursued.”137 Moreover, the policy objective declared in the income
tax regulations state, “The primary objective of adoption of the unre-
lated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair
132. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 46, at 2315.
133. The three fees that are fixed and paid independent of the funds performance are
management fees, transaction fees, and monitoring fees.
134. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
135. 26 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 513 (2012).
137. 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1(c) (2013).
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competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain ex-
empt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt
business endeavors with which they compete.”138
Two cases offer an interesting study in contrasting how courts
examine the issue of a trade or business within the not-for-profit con-
text. In one case, United States v. American Bar Endowment, the
actions taken by the tax-exempt organization resulted in a finding of a
trade or business.139 In the second case, National Association of Postal
Supervisors v. United States, the lack of action taken by the tax-ex-
empt organization resulted in a finding of a trade or business.140
In United States v. American Bar Endowment, the Supreme
Court considered “whether income that a tax-exempt charitable organ-
ization derives from offering group insurance to its members
constitutes ‘unrelated business income’ subject to tax.”141 The “Ameri-
can Bar Endowment (ABE) is a corporation exempt from taxation
under § 501(c)(3) of the Code.”142 “ABE’s primary purposes are to ad-
vance legal research and to promote the administration of justice
. . . .”143 However, “ABE [also] raises money for its charitable work by
providing group insurance policies, underwritten by major insurance
companies, to its members.”144
“Critical to ABE’s fundraising efforts is the fact that ABE re-
quires its members to agree, as a condition of participating in the
group insurance program, that they will permit ABE to keep all of the
dividends rather than distributing them pro rata to the insured mem-
bers.”145 ABE charges participating members a competitive rate.146
Because ABE insures a favorable risk pool, its costs of insuring are less
than the premiums it collects from its members.147 As a result, ABE
receives a refund of premiums paid at the end of each period that ABE
uses to fund its charitable activities.148 “In 1980 the Internal Revenue
Service advised ABE that it considered ABE’s insurance plan an ‘unre-
138. Id. at § 1.513-1(b).
139. 477 U.S. 105, 106 (1986).
140. 21 Cl. Ct. 310 (1990).
141. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 106 (1986) (sections 511
through 513 of the Internal Revenue Code provide the framework for taxation of not-for-
profit organizations).
142. Id. at 107.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 105.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 105 (1986).
148. Id.
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lated trade or business’ and that the profits thereon were subject to tax
under §§ 511 [through] 513.”149 The IRS audited ABE’s tax returns for
1979 and 1980 and assessed a tax deficiency on ABE’s net revenues
from the insurance program.150 ABE successfully challenged the IRS’s
determination and assessment of income tax deficiency and prevailed
in the Claims Court.151 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision of the Claims Court.152 However, the Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding that ABE was engaged in
a trade or business and therefore subject to the unrelated business cor-
poration tax.153
The Supreme Court found that “ABE’s insurance program falls
within the literal language”154 of the statutory definition of an “unre-
lated trade or business.”155 The Supreme Court scrutinized the
activities of the taxpayer. Two factors proved critical to the Supreme
Court’s analysis. First, the Court found that ABE’s activities of “assem-
bling . . . a group of better-than-average insurance risks, negotiating on
[the insureds] behalf with insurance companies, and administering a
group policy are activities that can be-and are-provided by private com-
mercial entities in order to make a profit.”156 The Court determined
these activities constituted activities beyond the scope of ABE’s ap-
proved exemption from income tax.
Second, the Supreme Court also noted that “ABE has a unique
asset—its access to the ABA’s members and their highly favorable
mortality and morbidity rates—and it has chosen to appropriate for
itself all of the profit possible from that asset, rather than sharing any
with its members.”157 This unique asset allowed ABE to charge its
members a competitive rate and realize an economic benefit in the
form of a premium refund. ABE successfully exploited its competitive
advantage by unabashedly overcharging its low risk insurance pool
and requiring members to forfeit a claim for refund.158
Exploitation of a unique asset proved troublesome for ABE. The
Supreme Court remarked, “Lacking a factual basis for concluding that
149. Id. at 108.
150. Id. at 105.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 105 (1986).
154. Id. at 110-11.
155. 26 U.S.C. §§ 511(a)(1), 512(a)(1), 513(a).
156. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 111.
157. Id. at 113.
158. Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT.
99, 102 (1991).
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generosity is at the core of ABE’s success, we can easily view this case
as a standard example of monopoly pricing.”159 In fact, monopoly pric-
ing is the objective of asset exploitation. The whole body of intellectual
property law is founded on this premise – the exploitation of a unique
asset160 to the exclusion of others,161 to reward one’s risk of engaging
in the activity and allow for a recovery of costs.162 By directing the fo-
cus of analysis to the exploitation of a unique asset, the Supreme Court
recognized the activity as one of the hallmarks of a trade or business
activity.163
In National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United States,
the United States Claims Court examined whether the activities of a
tax-exempt labor organization constituted a trade or business.164 The
plaintiff, National Association of Postal Supervisors (NAPS), “is a tax-
exempt labor organization that sponsors a health plan.”165 “NAPS’s
[tax-exempt] purpose was the ‘social and economic advancement of pos-
tal supervisors and improvement of the postal service.’”166
Prior to 1980, NAPS offered three classes of membership levels:
active, honorary, and associate. Membership in these three classes was
limited to postal supervisors. In 1980, NAPS amended its constitution
and bylaws to provide a fourth class of membership: the “limited bene-
fit” membership.167 The creation of a fourth class allowed “non-postal
federal employees [to become] limited benefit members, but only ‘for
159. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 113 (1986).
160. See KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWERFUL TOOL FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH 9 (2003), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/888/wipo_pub_888_1
.pdf.
161. Yonatan Even, Appropriability and Property, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1432 (2009)
(“Exclusionary rights promote exclusive use of assets and prevent tragedies of the commons.
Such rights also ensure that those exploiting the assets are free from the threat of poachers,
thereby enabling transactions with others for access to the fruits of their labor. Thus, it is
not surprising that Blackstone, Bentham, and many subsequent commentators have identi-
fied the right to exclude as the central right at the core of property regimes.”).
162. Malcom Gladwell, In the Air: Who Says Big Ideas Are Rare?, THE NEW YORKER
(May 12, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/05/12/in-the-air. Intellectual
property is justified, “[t]his phenomenon of simultaneous discovery—what science histori-
ans call “multiples”—turns out to be extremely common. One of the first comprehensive
lists of multiples was put together by William Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas, in 1922, and
they found a hundred and forty-eight major scientific discoveries that fit the multiple pat-
tern.” Id.
163. See generally Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110.
164. Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 310, 310 (1990).
165. Id. at 311
166. Id. at 312.
167. Id.
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the sole purpose’ of obtaining insurance” under the plan.168 Limited
benefit members paid $25 in dues.169
The change in policy by NAPS to expand the membership
proved fruitful. “From 1981 through 1984, NAPS experienced a sub-
stantial increase in limited benefit membership.”170  During this
period, limited benefit membership grew dramatically from “149 lim-
ited benefit members”171 to “almost 33,000 federal employees.”172
During the same period, “[l]imited benefit member dues generated sub-
stantial income”173 for NAPS. During 1983 and 1984, NAPS collected
“over $580,000” and “nearly $850,000” in limited benefit membership
dues.174 These amounts represented “sixty-four percent” and “sixty one
percent of NAPS’s total net operating revenues” for 1983 and 1984, re-
spectively.175 Upon audit, the IRS “determined that NAPS’s collection
of membership dues in return for health insurance was a trade or busi-
ness activity unrelated to the organization’s tax-exempt purpose.”176
NAPS paid the tax and filed suit seeking a refund for payment of the
tax.177
The Claims Court found that the limited benefit membership
differed substantially from the other levels of membership. For exam-
ple, the evidence disclosed that “[u]pon joining NAPS, active and
associate members received a membership kit,”178 whereas “limited
benefit members received only the health plan brochure, the insurance
underwriter’s pamphlet, and a cover letter from NAPS.”179 The brazen
distinction in service levels between membership tiers continued.
“NAPS perform[ed] many other services for its active and associate
members”180 that it did not perform for the limited benefit members.
For example, NAPS lobbied on behalf of its active and associate mem-
bers; NAPS had “the right to consult about pay issues, fringe benefits,
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 310, 312 (1990).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 313.
174. Id. at 314.
175. Id.
176. Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 310, 311 (1990).
177. The “IRS determined that NAPS owed $696,369.59 in additional tax and interest.”
Id. at 312.
178. Id. at 313.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 313.
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and other programs affecting its postal supervisors;”181 and “NAPS tes-
tified before Congress” on behalf of its postal membership. The
evidence did indicate that NAPS offered all members training and edu-
cation programs. “NAPS made no specific effort, however, to inform
limited benefit members of [available] training and education pro-
grams.”182 The distinction in service levels was all too apparent to
ignore.
In 1984, NAPS adopted a resolution granting to limited benefit
members the right “to participate in meetings, to serve on committees
and to offer technical advice.”183 NAPS sought to blunt the risk created
in providing minimal and disparate benefits to the limited benefit
members. The Chairman of NAPS explained the reason for the resolu-
tion by stating:
The reason this resolution is here because, one, these people184 are
getting nothing for their $25-you know, they are paying the pre-
mium on the health benefits also in full-but, second, and more
important, this was at the urgency and suggestion of our attorneys
and legal people because we could be in serious trouble if we left
this $25 as simply a fee and gave the people no participating rights
for it.185
The Claims Court concluded that the activity of providing limited
membership benefits constituted a trade or business and held for the
IRS. NAPS appealed the judgment of the Claims Court.
On Appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit,
affirmed the judgment of the Claims Court. The Federal Circuit rea-
soned that:
While earning a profit may not have been NAPS’s only motive in
offering insurance to federal employees who were not postal super-
visors, it was one of the primary reasons the union installed and
kept the $25.00 membership fee. The Claims Court found that
“NAPS knew before setting the limited benefit member dues that
each individual would cost the organization less than $25.00,” and
that the “Executive Committee set the $25.00 dues with knowledge
that this rate would generate profits.”186
181. Id.
182. Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 310, 314 (1990).
183. Id.
184. In this context, the clause “these people” refers to the limited benefit members. Id.
at 321.
185. Id. at 314.
186. Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 944 F.2d 859, 862 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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The following factors, outlined by the Claims Court, proved crit-
ical to the Court of Appeals decision:
First, the activity must “benefit . . . membership as a group, rather
than in their individual capacities.” Second . . . court[s] should as-
certain whether the fees charged by the organization are directly
proportional to the benefits that individuals receive. . . . Third, an
activity is less likely to be substantially related to an organization’s
tax-exempt purpose if “the service provided . . . is one commonly
provided by for-profit entities.”187
The disparity in service levels among the different membership
levels, coupled with the intent to generate a profit, resulted in a finding
that NAPS’s activity of providing insurance to its nonmembers consti-
tuted a trade or business, subject to the unrelated business income
tax.188 In the end, NAPS failed to demonstrate that its activities satis-
fied the basis for its income tax exemption triggering exposure to the
corporate income tax.189
F. Other Federal Statutes with Trade or Business Implications
The phrase “trade or business” is not solely limited to use in the
income tax code. The phrase courses throughout the United States
Code, touching a diverse range of federal statutes, reflecting Congres-
sional policies in areas such as, production and sale of handicraft items
by native American tribes,190 the regulation of firearms,191 structuring
transactions to evade the reporting of monetary instrument trans-
actions,192 extending trade benefits to certain Sub-Saharan
associations,193 determining who is eligible to receive federal grants to
reduce the production of methamphetamine,194 and protecting Alaskan
land leases.195
At present, forty-seven non-tax federal statutes employ the
phrase “trade or business.”196 The frequency and use of this particular
187. Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors, 21 Cl. Ct. at 324.
188. Id. at 324-26.
189. Id. at 326.
190. 16 U.S.C. § 450oo-5 (2015).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(A)-(F) (2006).
192. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(4) (2015).
193. 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(v) (2015).
194. 21 U.S.C. § 864a(a)(1)(C) (2015).
195. 43 U.S.C. § 687c (2015).
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 1278; 15 U.S.C. § 7705; 15 U.S.C. § 7903; 16 U.S.C. § 2708; 16
U.S.C. § 450oo-5; 18 U.S.C. § 1466; 18 U.S.C. § 1901; 18 U.S.C. § 921; 19 U.S.C. § 1516; 19
U.S.C. § 1677; 19 U.S.C. § 2401; 19 U.S.C. § 3721; 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv; 21 U.S.C. § 864a; 28
U.S.C. § 2631; 29 U.S.C. § 1002; 29 U.S.C. § 1082; 29 U.S.C. § 1301; 29 U.S.C. § 1321; 29
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phrase outside of the income tax code is striking. However, the mean-
ing of the term “trade or business” is undefined in these non-tax
statutes. Only two of the aforementioned federal statutes make a scant
attempt at a definition by making a passing reference to Section 162 of
the income tax code.197 Congress undoubtedly intended the adoption of
a general and undefined term. Therefore, courts are left with no legis-
lative guidance as to the meaning of this term. Presumably, the courts
will look to how the phrase has been used in the income tax statutes for
guidance.
What then is the intended meaning of the phrase “trade or busi-
ness” when used in a non-tax context? One must be mindful of the
“fundamental canon of statutory construction [which] is that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.”198 Should the interpretation of non-
tax statutes import a tax meaning when interpreting the phrase? The
range of federal statutes adopting this phrase beseeches an expansive
application of the term to fulfill Congress’ policy objectives.
For example, The Ethics in Government Act199 requires certain
federal officers and individuals200 to “file a report containing . . . [t]he
source, type, and amount or value of income . . . from any source”201
including, “[t]he identity and category of value of any interest in prop-
erty held during the preceding calendar year in a trade or business, or
for investment or the production of income, which has a fair market
U.S.C. § 1322; 29 U.S.C. § 1382; 31 U.S.C. § 329; 31 U.S.C. § 3901; 31 U.S.C. § 5312; 31
U.S.C. § 5318; 31 U.S.C. § 5321; 31 U.S.C. § 5324; 31 U.S.C. § 5326; 31 U.S.C. § 5328; 31
U.S.C. § 5331; 41 U.S.C. § 3101; 42 U.S.C. § 1382b; 42 U.S.C. § 403; 42 U.S.C. § 409; 42
U.S.C. § 410; 42 U.S.C. § 411; 42 U.S.C. § 418; 42 U.S.C. § 503; 42 U.S.C. § 9607; 43 U.S.C.
§ 1620; 43 U.S.C. § 687c; 46 U.S.C. § 2101; 49 U.S.C. § 30106; 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 102; 50 App.
U.S.C. § 571; 50 App. U.S.C. § 596; 6 U.S.C. § 395.
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 411(c) (2015) (relaying the definitions relating to self-employment,
which provides in relevant part that “[t]he term “trade or business,” when used with refer-
ence to self-employment income or net earnings from self-employment, shall have the same
meaning as when used in section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 403(k) (2015) (relating to certain reductions of insurance benefits for activity outside the
United States, which provides in relevant part that the term “ ‘trade or business’ shall have
the same meaning as when used in section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986”).
198. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). See also Schindler Elevator Corp. v.
United States, 563 U.S. 401 (2011) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give
them their ordinary meaning.”).
199. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. App. § 101 (2015)).
200. Id. at § 101(f) (The list of enumerated individuals required to file a report include
the “President, the Vice President, each officer or employee in the executive branch . . . who
occupies a position classified above GS-15 . . . Member(s) of Congress . . . [including] of-
ficer[s] or employee[s] of the Congress . . .  judicial officer[s], and judicial employee[s].”).
201. See id. at § 102.
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value which exceeds $1,000.”202 The policy for this statute is to ensure
integrity and establish accountability among federal workers.
Another federal statute prohibits the Secretary of Homeland
Security from “enter[ing] into any contract with a foreign incorporated
entity” if the foreign entity acquires “substantially all of the properties
held directly or indirectly by a domestic corporation or substantially all
of the properties constituting a trade or business of a domestic partner-
ship.”203 The policy reason behind this statute is to discourage U.S.
based businesses from reorganizing with foreign ownership and,
thereby, avoid paying U.S. taxation, while simultaneously reaping the
benefits of entering into a contract with the United States. Congress
was concerned with the high incidence of corporate inversion transac-
tions, that were essentially mere paper transactions costing the U.S.
treasury millions of dollars in lost tax revenue. This statute was en-
acted in response to the foreign reincorporation of an entity, where the
substance of the managerial and operational control remained within
the same group of American individuals.204 The policy justification for
this requirement is described by one writer as an “ ‘alternative sanc-
tion’ . . . to the traditional civil and criminal sanctions that is used to
stop a perceived abuse of tax law.”205
Yet another federal statute, an immigration statute, invokes
the phrase “trade or business” when determining whether individuals
from the countries of Cuba or Nicaragua have satisfied the conditions
to adjust their immigration status. Specifically, Title 8, Section 1255 of
the United States Code provides that, “for purposes of establishing
that the period of continuous physical presence” has been satisfied, the
individual must demonstrate that she “performed service, or engaged
in a trade or business, within the United States.”206
202. Id. at § 102(a)(3).
203. See 6 U.S.C. § 395 (2015) (regarding prohibition on contracts with corporate
expatriates).
204. See Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 863, 867 (2004) (“Another recent example of alternative sanctions arises in the context
of corporate inversions, whereby a company organized under the laws of the United States
changes its place of incorporation to a foreign country, such as Bermuda or the Cayman
Islands, in order to reduce its future United States tax liability. In response to this recent
phenomenon, Congress enacted, as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, an alterna-
tive sanction purporting to ban these former United States corporations from entering into
future contracts with the Department of Homeland Security.”).
205. Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24
VA. TAX REV. 475, 482 (2005).
206. Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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One final example, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(“FHSA”), brings certain private equity firms directly into the
crosshairs of the trade or business debate.207 Specifically, Section 1278
of the FHSA requires that certain toys intended for use by children
contain a cautionary statement. The purpose of this statute is to pro-
vide consumers with a warning about the hazards of small parts and
balloons. The statute applies to manufacturers, distributors, retailers,
importers, and private labelers. The statute exempts “an individual
whose selling activity is intermittent and does not constitute a trade or
business.”208
Private equity firms have taken a dominant investment posi-
tion in the toy industry. For example, “Toys‘R’Us, Inc. . . . the world’s
leading dedicated toy and baby products retailer . . . , operated as a
public company [until] . . . an investment group consisting of affiliates
of Bain Capital Partners LLC, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR)
and Vornado Realty Trust completed an acquisition of Toys‘R’Us, Inc.
for $6.6 billion” in 2005.209 In still another private equity transaction,
the “Transom Capital Group [ ] sold Uncle Milton Industries Inc., a . . .
maker of ant farms and other science toys for children, to KCB Man-
agement” for an undisclosed sum.210
Private equity firms will undoubtedly argue that they are not
engaged in the trade or business of selling toys. Predictably, they will
raise the time-honored defenses that separate corporate identities and
limited liability for investors justify holding only the operating com-
pany liable. However, fair questions arise when one considers whether
a private equity firm that provides consulting services, facilitates dis-
tribution, enables manufacturing alliances, or otherwise engages in
actions affecting the operations of the toy company is engaged in an
“activity” that constitutes a “trade or business” for purposes of this
statute. The debate is brought into full relief when one considers the
competing policy implications between the states’ economic develop-
ment interests and the federal government’s objective of regulating an
activity which directly affects the most innocent and unsuspecting
members of the population – our children.
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-78 (2012).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1278(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2015).
209. See About Toys“R”Us, Inc., TOYS“R”US, http://www.toysrusinc.com/about-us/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2016). “The acquisition encompassed all worldwide operations of Toys“R”Us,
Inc., including the Toys“R”Us and Babies“R”Us businesses. With the completion of this
transaction, each of the investors owns an equal stake in Toys“R”Us, Inc.” Id.
210. Dan Primack, Deals of the Day: HubSpot Preps IPO, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/02/28/deals-of-the-day-hubspot-preps-ipo/.
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G. Common Law Uses of the Phrase Trade or Business Illustrating
a Common, Plain and Ordinary Understanding
of Such Phrase
The phrase “trade or business” is also a common tool of analysis
conveying meaning beyond its statutory framework. Courts have in-
voked this phrase when identifying a litigant’s protectable property
interest despite the absence of a statutory mandate compelling the
presence of a trade or business.
In Caraway v. Ford Motor Company, the plaintiff sought to in-
voke the federal court’s jurisdiction by alleging that defendants
violated “provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton
Act, Title 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 12 et seq.”211 The court stated that “[a]
person who has been injured in his trade or business by the activities
of an unlawful monopoly, combination or restraint is entitled to recover
damages in an action at law for the loss suffered, recovery being sus-
tainable both at common law and under the federal anti-trust
statutes.”212
In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corpo-
ration,213 the United States Supreme Court “upheld the Illinois Fair
Trade Act . . . as affording ‘a legitimate remedy for an injury to the
good will which results from the use of trade-marks, brands or
names.’”214 In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court affirmed
“good will is property in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury
to any other species of property, is a proper subject for legislation.”215
The Court’s analysis recognized
[i]t is well settled that the proprietor of the good will “is entitled to
protection as against one who attempts to deprive him of the bene-
fits resulting from the same, by using his labels and trade-mark
without his consent and authority.” “Courts afford redress or relief
upon the ground that a party has a valuable interest in the good-
will of his trade or business, and in the trade-marks adopted to
maintain and extend it.”216
“In Kewanee, the [United States] Supreme Court held that Ohio’s law
of trade secrets, which, . . . granted monopoly protection to processes
211. Caraway v. Ford Motor Co., 144 F. Supp. 295, 295 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
212. Caraway v. Ford Motor Co., 148 F. Supp. 776, 777 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
213. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194 (1936).
214. Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Hess Bros., Inc., 243 F.2d 274, 276 (3d Cir. 1957) (citing
Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936)).
215. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co., 299 U.S. at 194.
216. Id. at 194-95 (citation omitted).
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and manufacturing techniques that had been in commercial use for
over one year but were otherwise patentable, was not preempted by the
federal Patent Act.”217 The plaintiffs in Kewanne sought a permanent
injunction to prohibit former employees from disclosing certain trade
secrets.218 In upholding the Ohio statute, the Court recognized that
“[t]he subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public
knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business.”219
Taken together, these cases help illustrate the common gloss
that the phrase “trade or business” has now acquired in American
jurisprudence.
H. Competing Policy Interests
Sun Capital Partners raises significant issues of importance in
tax law, pension law, and corporate law. Its holding creates broad pol-
icy implications for regulators, investors, and laborers concerning the
twin doctrines of preserving entity integrity and promoting limited
liability.
Economic history amply documents the evolution of investment
opportunities, investment strategies, and investment vehicles since the
early days of the joint-stock company in the sixteenth century. Ini-
tially, investment opportunities were simple and direct, and they
exposed investors to unlimited liability.220 With the advancement of
economic and social progress, investors insisted on greater legal pro-
tections and legislators responded by creating the limited
partnership.221 The concept of limited liability took on greater signifi-
cance with the proliferation of corporate entities and the advent of
limited partnerships in the nineteenth century. Legislation tending to
impose a burden of responsibility on corporations fell in favor of lax
regulation during the charter race of the nineteenth century.222 The
desire for limited liability continued unabated throughout the nine-
217. Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
218. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473 (1974).
219. Id. at 475.
220. See, e.g., Clowes v. Brettell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 885, 886 (Eng.) (finding that the
plaintiffs can look beyond the company to the shareholders for payment of debt).
221. See Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133 (Eng.) (providing limited liabil-
ity to companies with 25 or more shareholders); see also Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, 19
& 20 Vict. c.47 (Eng.) (extending limited liability protection to companies with seven or
more shareholders).
222. See The Rise of Big Business: The Corporate Revolution, DIGITAL HISTORY, http://
www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=2&psid=3165 (last visited Apr. 6.
2016) (pointing out that although some viewed this time period as the golden age of free
enterprise, working conditions were appalling and labor conflict was intense).
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teenth century and well into the twentieth century as investors sought
participation rights in the businesses they owned while preserving the
privilege of limited liability. State legislators responded late in the
twentieth century, enacting legislation allowing for the creation of
LLC, LLP, and LLLP entities.223 These entities perfected the concept
of limited liability by permitting investors to participate directly in the
entity while maintaining the privilege of limited liability.224 In the
midst of the investors’ quest for expanded participation and liability
privileges, Congress enacted federal legislation designed to protect
workers’ pensions and to prevent abuse through permissible corporate
structuring.225
Federal law has made it clear that it will not tolerate legal fic-
tions to avoid liability. Unlike state laws, where legislation grants to
investors great flexibility in separating and structuring investment ac-
tivities, federal law has expounded a standard of liability for certain
investment activities under prescribed circumstances. Federal law ex-
plicitly anticipated the need to consolidate entities under particular
circumstances.226 Therefore, the fictional separation of an entity’s ac-
tivities by investors that is permissible under state law principles is
irrelevant to the determination of liability under certain federal law
principles.
There is a noticeable trend afoot in finding private equity firms
responsible for the actions of their portfolio companies.227 The result of
finding a private equity firm liable as demonstrated in Sun Capital
Partners is no longer atypical. Federal regulators are aggressively en-
forcing statutes where enabling legislation is in place. The question is
not whether private equity funds should be held liable; rather, the
question is when should private equity funds be held liable. To this
end, Congress has spoken and enacted federal legislation providing
that “all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed
223. The Wyoming legislature started the “LLC revolution” with The Wyoming LLC
Act. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax Rationalization
Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 451
(2009).
224. See id. at 455-56.
225. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1302 (2012).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (“[A]ll employees of trades or businesses (whether or not in-
corporated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed by a single
employer and all such trades and businesses as a single employer.”).
227. See generally Young v. Fortis Plastics, LLC, No. 3:12–CV–364 JD CAN, 2013 WL
5406276 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2013); Vogt v. Greenmarine Holding, LLC, 318 F. Supp. 2d 136
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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by a single employer and all such trades and businesses as a single
employer.”228 Still, the question remains, what constitutes a trade or
business for purposes of the labor statute?
To date, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has articu-
lated a definitive standard for determining whether an activity
amounts to a trade or business. The cross-references between the rele-
vant labor statute and the tax statute on this point are both
incomplete.229 Congress has chosen instead to leave this determination
to the courts and the regulators. Determining whether a particular ac-
tivity constitutes a “trade or business” involves evaluating a myriad of
factors.  Some factors, such as incurring rental expenses230 or salary
expenses,231 are ubiquitous and can make the inquiry into identifying
the underlying trade or business uncomplicated and predictable. Other
factors, such as incurring legal fees232 or uniform expenses233, may be
unique to a particular activity, thus making the inquiry into identify-
ing a trade or business challenging and thought provoking.
Three Supreme Court cases have considered the question of
what constitutes a trade or business for purposes of business deduc-
tions under the income tax code. The Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to consider what constitutes a trade or business under the
Labor Code.234 And, unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit did not provide a standard of analysis in Sun Capital when it
declared one of the two equity funds to be a trade or business. Both the
labor code and the tax code use the phrase “trade or business.” None-
228. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).
229. “[T]rade or business” in 29 U.S.C. § 1301 cross references to 26 U.S.C. § 514, which
itself cross references to Section 162 where “trade or business” is statutorily undefined.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the phrase “trade or business” is limited in
Groetzinger.
230. In Quinlivan v. Comm’r, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1979), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that “Congress has expressly provided for the de-
duction of rental expenses where: (1) the payments are required to be made for the
continued use or possession of the property; (2) the continued use or possession of the prop-
erty is for purposes of the trade or business; (3) the taxpayer has not taken and is not taking
title to the property; and (4) the taxpayer has no equity in the property.”
231. Brewer Quality Homes, Inc. v.  Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 29 (T.C. 2003), aff’d, 122
F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2004).
232. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (adopting the “origin of the claim” test
for determining whether a legal expense is deductible under Section 162).
233. Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[C]ost of clothing is deducti-
ble as a business expense only if: (1) the clothing is of a type specifically required as a
condition of employment, (2) it is not adaptable to general usage as ordinary clothing, and
(3) it is not so worn.”).
234. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 132 (1st Cir. 2013).
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theless, the question remains: “What is a trade or business?” And
equally important for purposes of the labor statute is the following
question: “Is there a difference in meaning when applying the phrase
“trade or business” in the labor code from applying the identical phrase
in the tax code?” Specifically, should a reading of the phrase “trade or
business” for purposes of the labor statute yield a different result from
a reading of the phrase “trade or business” in the tax code? This ques-
tion has not been addressed by Congress, the courts, or academic
commentators. Sun Capital Partners offers a prime opportunity to ex-
amine how the distinction in interpretation and application of the
subject phrase operates.
IV. TWO PROPOSALS
Several approaches can be articulated to address the uncer-
tainty raised by the employment of identical terms in these federal
statutes.235 Possibilities abound to resolving the statutory ambiguity
such as the one “trade or business” raises. I propose two.
The first approach proposes the adoption of a definition of trade
or business for purposes of the labor statute. Thus far, Congress and
the courts have been reluctant to define the phrase “trade or business.”
However, a limited definition of the phrase “trade or business” is war-
ranted in light of Congress’ objective of protecting a wide base of
workers’ pensions, and given the protective posture of the phrase. Pro-
viding a limited definition of the phrase “trade or business” is without
precedent. For instance, the income tax regulations provide that “for
purposes of section 513 the term trade or business has the same mean-
ing it has in section 162, and generally includes any activity carried on
for the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of
services.”236
The labor statute at issue in Sun Capital Partners presently
provides that “all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not
incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as em-
235. See supra note 196 and accompanying text listing 47 different federal statutes.
236. The income tax regulations at 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1(b) (2013) provide in relevant
part, “any activity of a section 511 organization which is carried on for the production of
income and which otherwise possesses the characteristics required to constitute trade or
business within the meaning of section 162—and which, in addition, is not substantially
related to the performance of exempt functions—presents sufficient likelihood of unfair
competition to be within the policy of the tax. Accordingly, for purposes of section 513 the
term trade or business has the same meaning it has in section 162, and generally includes
any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of
services.”
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ployed by a single employer and all such trades and businesses as a
single employer.”237 I propose adding the following definition to clarify
the meaning of the statute:
For purposes of Section 1301(b)(1), the phrase “trade or business”
includes (1) any business activity organized and operated on a regu-
lar, continuous, or substantial basis in a profit motivated
transaction with another party under common control involving
any exchange at fair market value, or (2) any undertaking con-
ducted by any person engaging in a regular, significant or
meaningful manner in the operations, management, or policy mak-
ing decisions of another person under common control.
The first definition focuses the inquiry on exchanges at fair market
value and is consistent with the theory that rational individuals seek
to optimize their exchanges. The second definition focuses the inquiry
on “engaging in” activities that do not require an exchange at fair mar-
ket value but nonetheless indicate the presence of a trade or business
activity. The advantage to this approach is that it respects the separate
entity structure of LLCs, LLPs, and corporations under state law,
while providing liability in the event that a higher-tiered individual
usurps the policy, managerial, and operational control of the portfolio
company under federal law.
In the absence of a defined term, establishing a consistent defi-
nition of the term “trade or business” will continue to be a challenge.
Regulatory guidance will clarify the present ambiguity, thereby pro-
moting enforcement and compliance with the statute. When invoking
the labor statute, the need for a fixed definition of the phrase “trade or
business” is warranted to fill the statutory gap left open by Congress.
Three factors converge to justify providing a definition of a
trade or business. First, the modernization of the corporate laws al-
lowing for investor involvement in the underlying entity must be
recognized. Second, in addition to earning the traditional dividends
and appreciation, private equity firms now earn something more: they
earn management fees, transaction fees, and monitoring fees. Finally,
the difference in posture between invoking a benefit or imposing a bur-
den when invoking the phrase “trade or business” must be recognized
and applied by litigants.
A. Administrative Guidance Warranted?
It is unlikely that Congress is willing to act and adopt language
defining a trade or business for purposes of Title 29. This is especially
237. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).
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true given that Congress has already authorized the PBGC to “pre-
scribe” regulations with the only limitation that they be “consistent
and coextensive with regulations prescribed for similar purposes by
the Secretary of the Treasury under section 414(c) of Title 26.”238 What
remains, therefore, is for the PBGC to issue regulatory guidance defin-
ing a trade or business for purposes of the labor statute.
Regulatory guidance can take various forms, ranging from a for-
mal interpretive regulation to an informal administrative
pronouncement. The following question arises: whether such adminis-
trative guidance would be binding on a reviewing court. The answer
depends on the level of administrative action taken. Courts observe
three deference doctrines when evaluating administrative actions –
Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference each
named after the principal case.
In a Chevron-type analysis, a reviewing court evaluates formal
administrative pronouncements interpreting a particular statute. The
formal administrative pronouncement is almost always a regulation.
The court must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.”239 If Congress has directly spoken and
has “unambiguously expressed” its intention regarding the applicable
legislation, then the reviewing court is bound to follow Congress’ ex-
pressed intention.240 “If, however, the court determines Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be neces-
sary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”241 Naturally, the debate will
often center on what is the meaning of “the precise question at issue.”
In a Skidmore-type analysis, a reviewing court evaluates infor-
mal administrative pronouncements such as “rulings, interpretations
238. Id.
239. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
240. Id. at 843.
241. Id. at 842-43 (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”).
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and opinions of the Administrator”242 that interpret the application of
a particular statute. The Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”243
Nonetheless, a reviewing court “may properly resort [to these items]
for guidance.”244 One commentator notes, “Skidmore deference is pre-
mised on practicality—a recognition that agencies are institutionally
superior to the courts with respect to the interpretation of their
statutes.”245
In an Auer-type analysis, a court is reviewing an administrative
interpretation of an administrative action. For example, “[a]n adminis-
trative rule interpreting the issuing agency’s own ambiguous
regulation may receive substantial deference.”246 However, the Su-
preme Court cautions that “[a]n agency does not acquire special
authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its exper-
tise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to
paraphrase the statutory language.”247
The course of action taken by the administrative agency, if any,
will determine the level of judicial deference ultimately given by the
courts. If the administrative agency pursues formal regulations in ac-
cordance with the APA provisions, then the resulting regulation
receives Chevron-type deference. However, if the administrative
agency pursues informal pronouncements, thereby bypassing applica-
ble APA provisions, then the resulting regulations receive Skidmore-
type deference. Finally, if the administrative agency issues informal
pronouncements such as additional or clarifying announcements, then
the resulting administrative guidance will receive Auer-type deference.
B. The Dual Posture of “Trade or Business” - Accessing a Benefit
or Imposing a Burden
The second approach to address the uncertainty raised by the
employment of identical terms in these federal statutes proposes a
242. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Ad-
vanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
447, 455 (2013).
246. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 244 (2006).
247. Id.
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method of interpretation that unfortunately was not recognized by the
litigants nor the court in Sun Capital Partners. This approach requires
that litigants and courts first recognize the fundamental distinction in
the policy objectives between the income tax code and the labor statute
when invoking the subject phrase “trade or business.” Although not in-
itially apparent, there exists a fundamental difference in policy
objectives between the income tax code and the labor statute, despite
the fact that both employ the identical phrase “trade or business.” The
policy objective of the phrase “trade or business” in the income tax code
generally seeks to grant to individuals a statutory benefit.248 In con-
trast, the policy objective of the phrase “trade or business” in the labor
statute at issue seeks to impose on individuals a statutory burden.
Capturing this distinction in policy objectives within these statutes is
central to a proper understanding and application of the phrase “trade
or business.” Next, litigants and parties are to interpret the subject
phrase according to whether the statute grants a benefit or imposes a
burden. This is likely because statutes that grant a benefit are to be
narrowly construed, whereas statutes imposing a burden are to be
broadly construed.   Recognizing the distinction between benefit and
burden justifies the difference when interpreting the phrase “trade or
business.”
When a statute grants a benefit, as in the case of an income tax
statute, the statute should be narrowly construed to promote the Con-
gressional objective. Courts have repeatedly held that income tax
benefits are matters of legislative grace and, therefore, must be nar-
rowly construed.249 As a matter of statutory construction, the Supreme
Court iterated “the ‘familiar rule’ that ‘an income tax deduction is a
matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the
right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.’”250 Invoking the
phrase “trade or business” for purposes of accessing an income tax ben-
efit requires taxpayers to demonstrate a direct link between the
activity and the claimed income tax benefit.
In contrast, when a statute imposes a burden, the statute
should be broadly construed to recognize Congress’ full power to legis-
248. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 162 allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in a
“trade or business.” 26 U.S.C. § 469 requires the active participation of the taxpayer in the
trade or business activity before being allowed the benefit of the passive loss deduction
whereas, 26 U.S.C. § 162 contains no such requirement. But see 26 U.S.C. § 882, which
imposes an obligation on taxpayers with effectively connected income to report and pay in-
come tax.
249. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 59-60
(2011) (saying “exemptions from taxation are to be construed narrowly”).
250. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
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late, and to mandate. This means granting the presumption of
enforceability to the statute enacted by Congress, and requiring chal-
lengers to demonstrate why the particular statute is invalid. This
approach is consistent with the theory that protective251 and reme-
dial252 statutes are broadly construed to give full effect to
Congressional intent. A broad construction ensures compliance by indi-
viduals and enforcement by regulators alike. In tax law, the Supreme
Court has recognized this principle of broad construction when the
Court upheld “the full measure of [Congress’] taxing power.”253 In la-
bor law, the Supreme Court has likewise recognized this principle of
broad construction when the court stated, “Traditionally, the Supreme
Court and the circuit courts have noted that the FLSA should be
broadly construed by ‘look[ing] to its animating spirit.’ ”254 Other areas
of federal law such as healthcare law,255 environmental law,256 and an-
titrust law have adopted a similar rationale when imposing burdens of
responsibility. A broad approach is therefore justified by federal policy
objectives and by courts that have repeatedly held that legal fictions
should not frustrate public policy.
A critical distinction must be drawn between the three Supreme
Court cases that have examined the question of “trade or business” and
the argument advanced by the plaintiff in Sun Capital Partners that it
is not engaged in a trade or business. The plaintiff’s reliance on the
Supreme Court precedents is misplaced. In each of the three Supreme
Court cases257 examining the applicability of a “trade or business,” the
taxpayer sought to access a benefit. In contrast, the equity funds in
Sun Capital Partners sought to avoid a burden by relying on a narrow
application of the phrase “trade or business” when, in fact, a broader
interpretation is suitable. Understanding the distinction in posture
and interpreting the phrase accordingly (be it narrowly or broadly) pro-
motes efficiency, reduces conflicts, and provides litigants and
regulators alike with a degree of certainty and uniformity.
251. Avila v. A. Sam & Sons, 856 F. Supp. 763, 769 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“As general princi-
ple, the [Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act] is to be broadly
construed to protect migrant agricultural workers.”).
252. Marshall v. Coastal Growers Ass’n, 598 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The Farm
Labor Contractor Registration Act is remedial and should be broadly construed.”).
253. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 476 (1955).
254. Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (E.D.
Mo. 2009).
255. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 (1993).
256. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); Leslie
Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
257. See Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 212 (1941); Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S.
23, 23 (1987); United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 105(1986).
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CONCLUSION
The determination as to whether an activity amounts to a trade
or business is a challenging, daunting, and problematic inquiry. The
analysis itself requires working with legal standards that are impre-
cise and inexact. Congress and the Supreme Court have both refused to
articulate a definitive standard, preferring instead to leave it to the
courts to examine the facts and circumstances of each case before de-
ciding. This approach has proven to be a wise course of action when
considering the differing policy objectives that the phrase “trade or
business” is intended to promote.
Establishing what constitutes a trade or business inevitably in-
volves examining and balancing factors deemed critical to the
operation of a particular activity. For example, relevant factors may
include considerations such as the provision of goods and services,258
the active participation by the proprietor, managerial oversight by the
board of directors, instituting policy making decisions in the firm, mak-
ing operational decisions in the organization, requiring prior approval
for capital expenditures, approving marketing plans for the firm, or
hiring and firing firm personnel. In short, engaging in something more
than an occasional or insignificant involvement in the operations, man-
agement, or policy-making decisions of the firm is required. The phrase
“trade or business” is an amorphous standard: an elusive and slippery
concept incapable of a definitive description and yet elastic and flexible
to provide the necessary coverage to promote Congressional policy
objectives. Whatever the underlying circumstance, whenever a search
for the meaning of a “trade or business” is launched, we must be mind-
ful of the words of Justice Cardozo, who so eloquently captured the
essence of legal analysis when he wrote:
Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the decisive
distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One struggles in
vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone.
The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a
way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle.259
258. The Frankfurter approach of requiring exclusive goods or services was rejected by
the Supreme Court in Groetzinger. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 32 (“We must regard the Frank-
furter gloss merely as a two-Justice pronouncement in a passing moment and, while
entitled to respect, as never having achieved the status of a Court ruling.”).
259. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) (Cardozo, J.).
